International Refugee Law United Stated Versus Syria, Jordan and Lebanon
The Jordanian government has flexibly applied Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding, because legitimate refugees have sometimes extended their period of stay for a long time without being resettled (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). Besides, the Iraqis refugees who managed to be granted a refugee status in the United States are leading a life of frustration and despair (Amnesty International). These refugees are finding it difficult to get a job and are without secure income while others are constantly under the threat of evictions from their homes. Having no jobs, these refugees are unable to support themselves and those who depend on them if public assistance is limited (Olwan, 2009). Most of these refugees are traumatized and are need of additional financial support and healthcare (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
The US, Canada, New-Zealand, Australia and Ireland though signatories to the refugee convention have taken up a relatively smaller percentage of refugees compared to the non-signatory Arab League states. On the contrary, Syria and Jordan which are not parties to the convention have hosted more Iraqi refugees than these countries combined. The United States has always been quick to state how they are dealing with the human rights crisis in Iraq. They have admitted more than 16,000 refugees and this figure was expected to double by the close of 2009 (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007)..
An estimated 570 million has been spend since 2007 to enhance the conditions of the displaced Iraqis, but frankly speaking should take responsibility for the mess it created itself (Valentina, 2007). An estimated 2 million Iraqis have left the country because of the killings, car bombings and kidnappings after the US led invasion on Iraq to evict Saddam Hussein. Syria and Jordan, countries which are not party to the 1951 convention, are draining their savings straining their local services to keep the highest number of refugees compared to the United States (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
In fact, on both sides of the divide are warning how the growing desperation of the population in Syria and Jordan could threaten the stability within the region. Is not prudent that United States which orchestrated the war and more so that its a chief signatory to the 1951 Refugee convention to take responsibility and do more than the little it has done There is need for the United States to more than triple its expenditure on the displaced Iraqis and provide entry to over 100,000 in 2010 (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).. It is very ironical that the military budget far outweighs the humanitarian budget and the displaced numbers if far much higher than the current US admissions. The United States has a moral obligation and strategic interest to act.
The 1951 Refugee Convention was approved at the special UN conference on the July of 1951. The convention was adopted by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons which was held in Geneva (Valentina, 2007). Initially it was limited to the protection of European refugees after the Second World War but this geographic limit was lifted by the 1967 Protocol, typically expanding the scope of the convention. Denmark become the first to ratify the treaty and currently its has 147 signatories both to the convention and protocol (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
From November 2002 to March 2003 the international humanitarian regime estimated that one million refugees would flee Iraq in the wake of Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in what was termed as Operation Iraq Freedom. But six months after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, few Iraqis fled the country (UNAMI, 2009).
United States and Iraqi Refugees
Before the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, it has prepared beforehand by sending emergence aid workers to respond to the situation should it result in an exodus of refugees. Perhaps the international community had miscalculated andor misunderstood the peoples response. Three years after the war, the world was surprised when hundreds of thousands of the refugees from Iraq abandoned their homes between 2006 and 2007 escaping the collapse of deadly sectarian violence and insecurity which had plagued the country (Valentina, 2007). The estimates vary widely, but between one to two million Iraqis crossed the border into Syria and Jordan (Refugees Studies Centre). One of the dire consequences following the Iraq war was the displacement many which created a humanitarian crisis leaving thousands of Iraqis without prospects of a safe homeland (Jacobson, 2008).
Caught by surprise on the magnanimous number of Iraqis outflow, the then Undersecretary Paula Dobriansky stated that the United States would assist resettle 7,000 candidates, but in actual sense only 1,608 were resettled. Even when Bush admitted that over 250,000 Iraqis had crossed over to Jordan, little was done by the United States (Valentina, 2007). Senator Benjamin L. Cardin stated that the United States was attempting to keep the Iraqi refugee issue out of public limelight. There are those who believed that resettlement was a tangible measure which would underscore international commitment by the United States (Jacobson, 2008).
The Bush administration at the time appointed Lori Scialabba head of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services and Foley (Department of Homeland Security) to see to it that 12,000 Iraqis were admitted into the United States by 2008 (Goodwin-Gill McAdam, 2008).. Foley stated that the current system would enable an estimated 17,000 Iraqis to settle in the United States. The United States having spend over 400 million on the Iraqis refugees in Syria in 2007, has called on the international community to step up their support, stating that the Middle East problem is everyones problem (Olwan, 2009).
Younes of the Refugees International has urged the United States to step up its effort and show great leadership with respect to Iraq besides increasing its assistance substantially. The US former ambassador to the UN, John Bolton defended the United States that it has done generously enough with regard to the refugees denying the responsibility of the United States in overthrowing Saddam Hussein. He notes that United States is not to blame for the happening in Iraq, and that the prevailing circumstances are as a result of deep animosities which had existed in Iraq for decades.
On the other hand, the former UN humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, Denis Hallinday argues that the United States must take full responsibility of the was which must encompass massive payments to the Iraqi people(International Crisis Group, 2008). This would be used to facilitate the rehabilitation of the dilapidated country and make available the services which would be very instrumental in repatriation efforts. According to Denis, if the United States does this, then the likes of Iran, Saudis and Kuwaits would add more funds to the kitty besides providing other resources (Borger, 2004). He exclaims that leadership must emanate from the United States upon whom the whole responsibility falls (Jacobson, 2008).
Notwithstanding, the International Rescue Committee (2009) staff members from London, Brussels and Washington visited the Iraqi refugees in the United States and concluded that the there were major structural challenges with regard to funding and organization (Olwan, 2009). They are faced with issues such as homelessness and unemployment which is putting their well-being under threat. This is compounded by the high levels of injury, trauma and illness which have plagued the Iraqis hampering their integration into the American society. This is despite the fact that many Iraqis are highly educated individuals who are lawyers, doctors, accountants or scientist in their own capacities (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). It is a challenge for them to find employment in the United States even entry level jobs.
The United States being party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, by accepting the refugees, has the responsibility to grand them protection (UNAMI, 2009). Having no jobs, the Iraqi refugees have depleted their resources obtained from the IRC and day by day they are at the risk of being homeless. This is compounded by the fact that most of them are unable to pay for their rents for months now and are being threatened by notices (Goodwin-Gill McAdam, 2008).
The initial large groups of Iraqi refugees were resettled in the US after the 1991 Gulf War. Thousands of Iraqi refugees were settled in the United States from the Kurdish ethnic minority in the years 1992 and 1997. Those Iraqis who applied to be resettled in the US found out that they had to undergo additional background checks and security checks (Chatty, 2003).
Syria and Jordan Parties that did not sign up to the convention
Iraqi Refugees Syrias and Jordan Sacrifice
Unlike the United States, Syria has been offering Iraqi refugees assistance and care and continues to do so despite her limited material resources despite the fact that it owes no political responsibility to Iraq (Al-Miqdad, 2008). . But the influx of refugees into Syria has undoubtedly not been without its share of repercussions. In 2007, the UNHCR estimated that the Iraqi refugees in Syria were 1.2 million constituting 10 of the countrys 18 million population (UNHCR, 2003a). This proportionate number of Iraqi refugees had substantial effect on the Syrian face of life especially on the services offered by the state. Syria experienced sudden increases in its population which also strained the prices of basic goods and foodstuffs increasing by up to 30 while the rentals went up by 150. The consumption of water increased by 21 and the corresponding additional cost of supplying the drinking water rose to 6.8 million in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
Syrians did these despite the burden the refugees had on their economy. The human health needs of the new Iraqi arrivals are continuing to mount particularly those of women, the elderly and the children (Jacobson, 2008). The government of Syria is endeavoring despite enormous challenges brought about by declining resources, the need for surgical operations, vaccinations, healthcare interventions and childhood immunizations (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Majority of Iraq refugees fled to Jordan after the first Gulf war which occurred between Iraq and Iran towards the end of 1970s. These refugees of the first Gulf war was just a tip of the ice-berg as the overwhelming majority followed afterwards during the second Gulf war and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. After the second Gulf war, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq for more than a decade and this forced many Iraqis to flew from their country and seek refugee in Jordan. At the beginning of the US-led invasion, the number of Iraqis who were admitted in Jordan was approximately 300,000 (Fafo, 2007).
There had been no significant Iraq refugees during the fighting of 2003. However, the occupation culminated in a human crisis coupled with escalating sectarian violence in Iraq. The mass arrivals arose after the Mosque was bombed in Sammarra in early 2006. Recent estimates have indicated that as much as one million or 18 of Iraqis refugees are living in Jordan. According to the estimates by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, between 500,000 and 750,000 refugees from Iraq, constituting 10 of the nations populations are hosted in Iraq (Amnesty International USA, 2009).
The number of Iraq refugees in Jordan has been fluctuating considerably because a significant number Iraqis keep on moving in and out of Jordan (Borger, 2004). Nonetheless, FAFOs estimates seems to be an overstatement, considering that Jordans population is slightly less than six million and if this number is added to the Palestinian refugees, majority of whom have been registered with the UNRWA then there will be an assumption that Jordan accommodates the worlds highest refugee to total population ratio (Fafo, 2007).
Entry restrictions
Initially Jordan had flexible immigration policy towards Iraqis. For instance, they were accepted to enter the kingdom of Jordan with valid passports and no special entry visas was required (Olwan, 2009). Generally, they were issued with a visa valid for one month at the border of entry in addition they were allowed to register as visitors for an extended period of three to six months, although they were denied working permits and the residence permits which were given subject to renewal (Laura, 2008).
Jordan tightened entry and residence restrictions in the wake of Iraq terrorist bombings of three luxury hotels in Amman in late 2005 which resulted in the death of sixty people. Since the terrorist bombings, the Jordanian authorities have stringently turned away Iraqis at the border and they have further limited the time of validity of entry visas to three days. Renewal of Iraq residency permits has been scrutinized too and more conditions have been attached to them (Jacobson, 2008). These measures have led to soaring numbers of illegal Iraq refugees in Jordan. Nonetheless the Jordanian government has continued to faithfully give out one-year renewable permits to Iraq students, investors and employees (Goodwin-Gill McAdam, 2008).
The Jordanian authorities have passed legislations to govern Residence and Foreigners. The law No. 24 of 1973 imposes a JD1.5 per day fine on visitors who overstay beyond their permitted period of residence. Consequently, the Iraq families who are willing to go back to their homes have been held hostage because of the financial burdens imposed on them. The Jordanian government normally gives the illegal Iraqi residents a grace period to facilitate their status and to acquire legal residency in accordance to the law (Jacobson, 2008).
The grace period of status rectification is a platform for the illegal Iraqis to comply and facilitate their legality in accordance to the Jordanian laws. And to those who comply, an olive hand is extended by exemption from accumulated fines (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Nevertheless, it is clear that the many Iraqis residing in Jordan havent yet rectified their status because either because they are unwilling to present themselves to the Jordanian authorities or they are poor and they cannot afford the accumulated fines. Consequently, their continued stay in Jordan remains illegal. Nonetheless, Jordan has never instigated inspection campaigns to validate the compliance of Iraqis to residency and labor laws as it routinely does towards illegal foreign workers (Olwan, 2009).
The essence is that Jordanian authorities do not consistently enforce immigration laws against Iraqis who have overstayed and as a rule Jordan has implemented a policy of significant tolerance and clemency in enforcing immigration, residency and working laws towards Iraqis living in Jordan. However, this has not been granted an official position. It must be stressed that still there is some opposition to the Iraq presence in Jordan especially due to the prevailing socio-economic hardships endured by Jordanians owing in part to the overwhelming numbers of Iraq refugees and the rise in the cost of living in Jordan (Laura, 2008).
Jordan has sought to regulate the flow of Iraqis. Consequently, Iraqis who wish to enter the Jordan territory as of May 1, 2008 must possess a visa issued in advance. Owing to the absence of an operational Jordanian embassy in Iraq they have been forced to apply through the international courier TNTs offices in Baghdad or through Jordanian missions in third countries (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). A consensual agreement between TNT and the Jordanian government has permitted TNT to accept visa applications from Iraqis, ensures their processing and eventually forwards them to the Jordanian ministry of interior (Goodwin-Gill McAdam, 2008). Applicants receive the feedback from the Jordanian government within two weeks.
In the last five years, the third countries including the Scandinavian countries, mainly signatories to the refugee convention of 1951 have hosted refugees from Sudan, Somali, Iran, Kurdstan, Iraq, and Palestine (Borger, 2004). The US, Canada, New-Zealand, Australia and Ireland though signatories to the refugee convention have taken up a relatively smaller percentage of refugees compared to the non-signatory Arab League states (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Despite the fact that other refugees returned to Iraq or to their ancestral countries, majority of Palestinian refugees were unable to return to Iraq because they feared reprisal from Iraq armed militia and they couldnt go to their mother country because of the restrictions of Israelites who denied them the right of return. Nonetheless, those Palestinian men who married in Jordanian wives were granted the right of stay in Jordan (Fafo, 2007).
Finally, and after spending five years enduring misery in Al Ruwaished camp, the government of Brazil generously accepted to resettle 108 remaining Palestinians in November 2007(Olwan, 2009). These Palestinians became the first batch of refugees coming from outside Latin America to benefit from the solidarity settlement program adopted by 20 Latin American countries, suggested to the long-lasting solution for refugees in the 2004 Mexico plan of Action (Jacobson, 2008). With the eventual evacuation of Al Ruwaished, the camp originally established after the US led invasion in Iraq was finally closed down.
Similarly another group of 40 Iranian Kurdish refugees are still stuck in the Al karama camp in the no-mans land between Iraq and Jordan and have been denied entry into Jordan. These refugees who fled had initially sought refuge in Iraq from their mother country in Iran at the beginning the first Gulf war in late 70s and early 80s (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).. They shortly lived in a refugee camp near Ramadi in Iraq until 2005 when they resolved to leave for the Jordanian border after being attacked by insurgents (International Crisis Group, 2008). More than 650 Kurds were resettled abroad in northern Iraq, although 190 of them remained in the camp. It is worthy pointing that the UNHCR does not recognize them as refugees because it believes that they still have an alternative long-lasting solution in Northern Iraq and hence do not need to be resettled outside the region (Chatty, 2003).
The right of Asylum in Jordan
Political refugees who seek asylum in Jordan are protected by the constitution which bans extradition on account of their political beliefs or for their defense of liberty. In practice, Jordan has never cherished the refugee convention or the Casablanca protocol (Borger, 2004). Furthermore, her municipal law doesnt accord asylum seekers a complete package of human rights as enshrined in the 1951 convention. Jordan has not included the definition of refugees in its legislations and it has not institutionalized policies for the determination of refugee status (Olwan, 2009). Nevertheless, because of its central location it has constantly found itself on the receiving end as fleeing refugees from the Palestinian territory seek asylum in Jordan. After the second Gulf war, UNHCR opened a regional office in Amman to provide international aid to Iraq asylum seekers. In addition, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR which effectively permitted UNHCR to assist refugees and other persons under its obligation with the exclusion of Palestinian refugees (Article 3) (Olwan, 2009)
The MOU domesticated the provisions of the refugee convention of 1951 and the promulgations of the 1967 Casablanca protocol which Jordan had not acceded to. The MOUs definition of refugees was a replication of the definition endorsed by the 1951 convention and the 1966 protocol both of which are concerned with the status of refugees but without geographic and time limitations (Article 1 of the MOU) (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
The principle of non-refoulent stipulates that no state shall refuse admission to people claiming to be refugees. Hence, according to the MOU Jordan cannot deny entry to refugees seeking asylum in its territory or expatriate refugees to countries where their life or freedom could be threatened on the basis of their racial, religious, national, membership of particular social group or political opinion (Article 2) (Goodwin-Gill McAdam, 2008).
There was a consensus that UNHCR could be responsible for interviewing asylum seekers who entered Jordan surreptitiously and who were being held by competent authorities. After interviewing the illicit refugees, UNHCR give its recommendations within one week except for special cases which require further procedures but even then the period should not exceed one month (Article 3) (Olwan, 2009). Although Jordan is expected to establish institutional mechanisms for transparent status determination (Article 14), these institutional mechanisms have not yet been put in place (Chatty, 2003).
The UNHCR and Jordanian government have concurred that asylum seekers and refugees should be protected as per the internationally recognized standards. Consequently, refugees should be granted the legal status and UNHCR should strive to find long-lasting solutions be it voluntary repatriation to the mother country or resettlement in third party countries (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). Article 5 of the MOU limits the timeframe for repatriating legitimate refugees to less than six months. Apparently Jordan abhors the principle of local integration, even though this is what preferred by all Iraqis, Palestinians and Kurds (Olwan, 2009).
The Jordanian government has flexibly applied Article 5 of the memorandum of Understanding, because legitimate refugees have sometimes extended their period of stay for a long time devoid of being resettled. However, it is just a small fraction of the most vulnerable Iraq refugees who can pragmatically expect to be considered for resettlement to third countries. Hitherto, the US, Brazil and eleven other European countries have admitted 10,177 refugees. The number of refugees who had left their host countries as of December 1, 2007 were 4,575 merely 22 of the referred cases. In total 1,534 refugees had been expatriated from Jordan before November 30, 2007 (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Besides, thousands of Iraq refugees are precariously held in the Middle East and they are in dire need of resettlement. Generally the resettlement option is not always viable because apparently the number of refugees who are seeking resettlement could overwhelm the limited places offered by host countries ready to host these Iraq refugees. These categorically explain the reason behind the overwhelming majority of Iraqis living in Jordan and are not officially recognized by the UNHCR as refugees (Chatty, 2003).
The living conditions for the Iraqi refugees in Jordan have been governed by bilateral agreements, national law, the international conventions on human rights and other general international law (International Crisis Group, 2008)..
Right to Education in Jordan
Before the 20062007 school year, all foreign children (Iraqis included), were not legalized to attend Jordanian public schools. But those who held residency permits were enrolled in the private schools (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Because of this, only 14,000 Iraqi children were able to attend Jordanian schools in years 20052006 rising to 18,000-19,000 students in private and public schools in 20062007 school year. Despite this remarkable increase, this was only a drop in the ocean as 200,000 Iraqi refugee children were not able to attend school.
Come August of 2007, Jordanian Ministry of Education allowed all school going children to attend both private and public schools regardless of their status of residency. According to the Ministry of Education at the time, an estimated 50,000 Iraqis were earmarked to attend schools by the end of 2007, unfortunately, only 22,000 had enrolled by the end of September the same year. This slow down in the enrollment process was attributed to other factors (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
Most Iraqi refugees had overstayed their visas but continue to stay Jordan fearing that they might be rounded up and repatriated back to their homeland, making them reluctant to have their children join the Jordanian schools (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).. Other factors included the fact that many children continue to work in Jordan and many families are unable to afford fee payments required in primary and secondary schools. In any case, about 24,000 Iraqi refugee children attend schools in Jordan, of which 6,000 attend private schools. This implies vast majority are attending schools in Jordan (Olwan, 2009).
It is a fact that even though the Jordanian constitution guarantees education to nationals, it does not prohibit the foreign children from attending schools. The Kingdom is party to the 1989 CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child). Article 28 of the CRC provides for the rights of children to education. Jordan is also party to the CERD (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination) which implies that it has to make sure that public education is made available to the undocumented immigrants and non-citizens.
The Right to Work
According to Article 23 of the Jordanian constitution, every Jordanian does have the right to work and opportunities are provided for all citizens. Furthermore, Article 12 of 1996 Jordanian Labor Law provides for the employment of foreigners. However, approval is required from the Ministry of Labor among not only among the Jordanians but also among other foreigners and this approval is depended upon the lack of ability and relevant experience among the Jordanians. Furthermore, priority is given to the Arab workers (International Crisis Group, 2008).
To work in Jordan, Iraqi and Palestinian refugees have to posses a one year work permit from the Ministry of Labor. The ministry charges a fee for the permit issuance and renewals through the employer. Foreign workers including the Iraqi refugees who violate the Jordanian law are subjected to deportation and cumulative fines. If deported, they are not allowed to return until three years are passed from the date of deportation. Jordan applies rather strict rules when in it comes to admission of Iraqi refugees solely because of the socio-economic conditions bedeviling the country (Borger, 2004). These are some of the reasons why some categories of jobs in government and public sectors and other occupations which are connected with national defense and security are reserved for the nationals of Jordan. The non-Jordanian nationals are not allowed to join unions (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
Healthcare
Iraqis are allowed access to subsidized healthcare in Jordanian hospitals irrespective of their residence status, but if the Iraqi refugees want more medical care then they have to pay for it in the private hospitals (Commondreams.org, 2007).
The Rights of the Palestinians
For more than six decades, Palestinian refugees have continued to present one of the largest and most protracted cases of displacement in the world. Majority of these Palestinian refugees were displaced in the mid-20th century when the state of Israel employed military force and invaded Arab villages and towns.
Besides, numerous displacements have occurred since for instance during the 1967 Arab-Israel war (Borger, 2004). The wave of Palestinian displacement has generated massive international debate especially to the parties of the international refugee convention of 1951. Since most Palestinian refugees live in Arab countries such as Syria, Jordan and Lebanon and in the occupied Palestinian territories such as East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip they been deprived the basic human rights enshrined in the convention because these states are non-signatories to the convention (International Crisis Group, 2008).
For instance, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Lebanon hosts approximately 500,000 Palestinian refugees. More than half of these live in 12 refugee camps while the rest reside in major towns and gatherings outside the camps. Generally speaking, the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon is the most unfortunate and impoverished refugee community in any Arab country in the World. The Lebanese government have deprived them of essential basic human rights and subjected them to spatial, economic and institutional marginalization coupled with social exclusions, violence and massive displacements.
Rights Framework Lebanese legislation relating to Palestinian Refugees Basic Rights
The Lebanese legislations continue to consider Palestinian refugees as foreigners. In these regard, the Lebanese laws denies the Palestinian refugees the basic rights granted to its citizens, while at the same time not according them the refugee rights documented and enshrined in the refugee law and the relevant international instruments. In spite of their prolonged longevity in Lebanon, they still lack provisions acknowledging them legally (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). Thus, unlike most laissez-faire democracies, where citizenship rights are determined by the period of residency, in Arab countries including Lebanon nationality is key to these rights, where the right to citizenship is the key from which other rights and entitlements are derived (Olwan, 2009).
Since 1948, Palestinian refugees have lived under harsh conditions. The United Nations has dedicated a secretariat devoted specifically to their rights. In contrast to other refugees, the rights of Palestinian refugees are defined differently. However, contrary to the stereotyped picture most of them do not reside in camps (Amnesty International).
Although Jordan is a non-signatory to the refugee convention it hosts more than 1.9 million Palestinian refugees all of whom have been granted Jordanian citizenship. Whats more only 300,000 are living in camps. The Gaza strip holds one million Palestinian refugees whereby half are residing in camps. In the West Bank there are 750,000 Palestinian refugees, out of these about 175,000 are living in camps. Syria is hosting 450,000 Palestinian refugees, 250,000 of whom are living in camps (International Crisis Group, 2008). Nevertheless, the Syrian government has granted them working and traveling rights however, they are not recognized as citizens and they have been denied voting rights.
The Lebanese government is hosting 400,000 Palestinian refugees half of whom living in camps. In addition to these officially registered numbers of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 10 have not been registered and approximately 15,000 are non-ID Palestinians. Lebanon and Syria have ratified the 1965 Casablanca protocol on the treatment of Palestinian refugees. Generally speaking, the rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are severely truncated they have no rights to Lebanese schools andor health facilities (Amnesty International).
Right to Residency, Travel, and Freedom of Movement
As in other Arab contracting states, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are entitled to identification cards and travel documents. Nevertheless, the Palestinian refugees freedom of movement and residency is subject to subjective implementation and changes in the political atmosphere. For instance, the Lebanese interior minister issued a declaration in 1978 regulating the entry and exit of Palestinians into and out of Lebanon (Borger, 2004).
This declaration effectively prevented 15,000 Libya based Palestinians with Lebanese residence from returning to Lebanon without a special re-entry visa after Colonel Gaddafi expelled them from Libya. This entry restriction also affected other Lebanese Palestinians who happened to be outside Lebanon at the time. This pronouncement violated article (9) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which Lebanon had ratified. In addition it was contradicted with the Lebanese commitment as a member of the Arab League with emphasis to the Casablanca Protocol of 1965 (International Crisis Group, 2008).
Right to Work and to Social Security
The Lebanese Laws recognizes Palestinian refugees as foreigners. Consequently, they have been guaranteed the right to work and social security under the Declaration No (17561) of September 1962. This declaration which regulates the foreign labor in Lebanon integrates three restrictive principles concerning the rights of Palestinian refugees to work and employment in Lebanon. They are
The right to secure work permit
The right to national preference and
The reciprocity of rights and obligations.
Generally it is not easy for Palestinian refugees to get work permits. Besides, Palestinians who have secured work permits do not benefit from Lebanese social security arrangements despite the fact that they make regular contributions as other Lebanese workers. The right to social security for Palestinians is also dependent on the reciprocity of treatment keeping in mind that Palestinian refugees are not considered foreign nationals of a state bound to Lebanon by reciprocity (Sassoon, 2009).
Since 2005, the Lebanese government began admitting Lebanese born Palestinians into manual and clerical jobs formerly unavailable to them nevertheless, Palestinian refugees have been banned from seeking professional employment. The Lebanese laws and state practices concerning employment are inconsistent with the Lebanese commitment under the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ratified in 1971 (Fafo, 2007).
Right to Own and Inherit Property
Lebanese laws have strict conditions concerning foreigners freedom to acquire property. Before 2001, the Palestinians were bound by the legislative decree No.11614 of 1969 concerning the acquisition of immovable property in Lebanon. Article 3 of this declaration distinguished foreigners based on their citizenship, granting Arab citizens, Palestinians included, the right to acquire property without prior license though on a limited scale. For instance up to 3000m2 in Lebanese capital- Beirut and up to 5000m2 in the rest of the country (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
However in April 2001, the Lebanese government annulled the first article of the declaration and barred Palestinians from owning property. The resulting law prevented Palestinians from acquiring property and inheriting real estate which they formerly owned. This decree isolated Palestinians from the public limelight and disposed them into refugee camps. These restrictive measures robbed Palestinian refugees of adequate housing and further deterioration of their living conditions. Consequently, the annulment of the legislative decree NO. 11614 of 1969 were inconsistent with the Lebanese commitment under the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ratified in 1971(Olwan, 2009)
Right to Education and to Health
For more than 60 years Palestinian refugees have been denied access to Lebanese government hospitals and associated health services. Consequently, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), the Palestinian Red Cross Society (PRCS) and other Non-Governmental Organizations have been left with the duty of providing the health services fro the Palestinian refugees regardless of the incompetence of the services provided by the UNRWA, PRCS and associated NGOs (Amnesty International).
Contrary to the right to health services, Palestinian refugees have been granted access to Lebanese government schools and Lebanese Universities though with attached conditions i.e., admission to government vocational training is a preserve of the Lebanese nationalities and the faculty of Arts in state Universities is absolutely reserved for the Lebanese students (Amnesty International).
International and Regional Protection of Palestinian Refugees
No single international agency has been specifically assigned to safeguard the Palestinian refugees impasse. In addition to the UNHCR, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) and the UNRWA has been specifically created to cater for the plight of Palestinian refugees. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) commissioned the UNCCP under Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948 to defend Palestinian refugees displaced in the 1948 war (Borger, 2004).
UNCCP was mandated to reconcile the parties and find a permanent solution to the refugees problem and to uphold the Palestinian refugees rights to go back to their country and the right to property. However, the parties disagreed to implement resolution 194 under which UNCCP was operating hence making it to fail to successfully discharge its mandate. Consequently, in 1950s UNCCP narrowed its operations to property identification and documentation (Sassoon, 2009).
On the other hand UNRWA was created on the counsel of the Economic Survey Mission as an auxiliary organ to the UNGA resolution 302 (IV) of December 1949 to join forces with local governments and provide direct relief and works programs as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission (Article 7a) (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2008). Under this framework the UNGA recognized that without disregard to provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 that prevention of the predicaments of Palestinian refugees was critical to avert starvation and distress amongst them and to enhance conditions of peace and stability. It must be understood that UNRWA has not been authorized to provide legal protection to the Palestinian refugees, however it has been mandated to provide health, education and social services so as to economically empower Palestinian refugees and guarantee them social rights (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007)..
UNHCR is responsible for protecting refugees and searching for long-lasting solutions globally. However, the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees barred UNHCR from protecting Palestinian refuges displaced in 1948 according to paragraph 7c of UNHCR statue and Article 1D of the 1951 refugee convention. Paragraph 7c states that competence of the UNHCR shall not be extended to any person who receives aid from any other UN agency.
While the first paragraph of Article 1D outlines that the refugee convention shall not apply to persons receiving relief from UN agencies besides the UNHCR aid. The second paragraph lifts suspension of the Palestinian refugees under article 1D which stipulates that when such relief has been suspended for any other reason without the plight of the refugees being conclusively settled in accordance with the relevant statues adopted by the UNGA, these people shall be unconditionally entitled to the benefits stipulated in the convention (Sassoon, 2009).
It is widely acknowledged that the role of UNHCR is to provide protection and relief services to Palestinians refugees incase the UNCCP and UNRWA fail to fulfill their mandate or cease to operation for one reason or the other so as to ensure persistent protection of Palestinian refugees. However, UNHCRs recent interpretation of Article 1D is that the 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees who live outside UNRWA modus operandi are beneficiaries of the refugee convention under Article 1D and are granted UNHCRs relief assistance (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2008).
Besides, the Palestinian refugees who are not classified both to the 1948 and 1967 refugees and are residing outside Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and are incapable of going back to their ancestral country due to the apprehension fall within the precincts of the 1951 refugee convention under Article 1 A(2). It is important to note that many of the guidelines of the universal human rights instruments are applicable to Palestinian refugees including those living in Lebanon, given that Lebanon has acceded to the 1966 international treaties and to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Amnesty International).
In conclusion, the inadequacy of the UNCCP protection, the insufficient protection provided by the UNRWA and the derisory and narrow protection given by the UNHCR creates grave gaps as far as protection of Palestinian refugees is concerned and the search for the long-lasting solutions (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2008). Definitely this is an implication that more than one third of the worlds total refugees have been left without satisfactory international protection (Amnesty International).
Regional Protection
Syria and Jordan have not ratified the refugee convention. Nevertheless, the 1992 Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World which defines a wide scope of protection rights still lacks the binding force. But for the Palestinian refugees, refoulement is not a big question since they are ready to go back to their country, but they have been deprived of the right to go back to their homes in accordance with UNGA resolution 149 (International Crisis Group, 2008).
The Casablanca protocol adopted by Council of Ministers only addresses the issue of provisional protection of Palestinian refugees in Arab contracting states. This is considered to be earliest regional experiments in refugee protection (Borger, 2004). The Casablanca protocol insinuates that the while Palestinian refugees maintains the status quo as far as their nationality in concerned, they should be granted similar treatment as nationals of the Arab League states in regard to the right to work and employment the right to leave the country they live in and to return back the right to be given travel documents and the freedom of residence and movement within the Arab League states (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007)..
In total, the resolutions of the Arab States Council and the Casablanca protocol have theoretically rekindled hope in the hearts of Palestinian refugees as they have guaranteed them transitional protection in the Arab League member states with the hope that they will return back to their ancestral homes. But experts have largely argued against the rights accorded to Palestinian refugees under the Casablanca protocol deeming them insufficient compared to the refugee rights encapsulated in the 1951 convention (Olwan, 2009).
Scholars have also argued that the Arab legal refugee system for caring to the needs of Palestinian refugees at the pan-Arab level is comprised of three correlated elements Statelessness- the Arab League states has defended the clause of maintaining the status quo of Palestinian refugees as a positive discrimination intended to stop their permanent resettlement in he host countries hence preserving their right of going back to their ancestral homes (International Crisis Group, 2008).
UNRWA- this element deals with politicization of UNRWA, establishing a link between the international community and UNRWAs responsibility and the execution of UNGA resolution 194, where the UNGA resolution 302 which established the UNRWA displays various aspects of this link (Amnesty International). For instance, it encompasses that the agencys activities should be carried out devoid of prejudices in accordance to the provisions of resolution 194 (Borger, 2004).
Social and economic rights- since the early 1950s, the Arab League has ratified treaties outlining measures and standards aimed at guaranteeing transitional protection of the Palestinian refugees the most outstanding among them is the Casablanca protocol. Nonetheless, they have not successfully implemented the provisions to the letter (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007).
Lebanese perceptions attitudes towards the Palestinian refugees
Lebanon is a multi-religious nation with multiple sects. Its political composition is confessional since the National Pact of 1943. Historically the Lebanese-Palestinian relationship has been sour although this has radically changed since the early 1950s (Musalo, Moore, Boswell, 2007). These changes have always been marked by controversies in the Lebanese and regional politics and have been associated with violence and displacements (Tiltnes, 2005). These relations have recently been exacerbated by the crisis in the camp of Nahr el-Bared.
The Lebanese government has since declared new strategies aimed at altering their relationship with the Palestinian refugees, namely
Recognition of Lebanese sovereignty and security
Support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian refugees
Promotion of a dignified and prosperous life for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon pending a just and Comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict
Shared international responsibility for the refugee issue. (Amnesty International)
The official Lebanese-Palestinian impasse was suspended until the assassination of the former Lebanese Premier Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. His death sparked a new era between the Lebanese and Palestinians. The era which initiated customized recommendations and increased the frequency of contacts between Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese government which climaxed in the foundation of the new governmental body under the office of the Prime Minister the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) in 2005 October, charged with ensuring the re-opening of the PLO office which had been closed since 1982 and launching dialogue with Palestinians (Tiltnes, 2005).
Conclusion
What emerges from these findings is how countries which are not part to the 1951 Refugee Convention have responded to the refugee crisis in Iraqi far much better than the chief signatories such as the United States.
The Republic of Syria is not party to the 1951 Convention of the 1967 Protocol. Syria and Jordan has a Memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR and the Jordanian government has flexibly applied Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding, because legitimate refugees have sometimes extended their period of stay for a long time without being resettled. The United States despite holding the blame as the masterminds of the war, it has not taken adequate responsibility in dealing with the Iraqi refugee issue. The questions that will continue to linger in the minds of many have to do with how the countries who are parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention such as the United States, have defiantly acted against the convention membership provisions. The effectiveness of the 1951 Refugee Conventions are without doubt, under question especially in reference to the Iraqi and Palestinian refugee cases. Contrary, such conventions should be adhered is they have to be meaningful in dealing with such humanitarian crises.
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