Key points of the Opinion
The Appellant had argued that the trial Court violated his right to present a defense and to compulsory process by excluding a defense expert in memory theory. The Court rejected this argument because the basis of the States accident reconstruction experts was based on the witness accounts which were found more reliable and not on memory theory.
Secondly, the Appellant argued that the trial Court erred by precluding him from admitting evidence that he did not bargain with the prosecution over admissibility of evidence. His severed co-defendant had made a deal with the prosecution to give a statement on condition the statement would not be used against him. The appellant argued the Jury had been led to infer that he also bargained with the prosecution along the same lines. This argument was rejected by the Court for three reasons. Firstly, he had the chance to controvert the alleged inference by presenting evidence at the trial which he neglected to do. Secondly, the Court duly instructed the jury to consider only the evidence before it and it is presumed the jury follows the Courts instructions. Lastly, The Court opined it would be too great a leap of logic to say that the jury would infer the Appellant made a bargain with the prosecution just because his severed co-defendant had done so.
Thirdly, the Appellant had contended that the prosecutors closing speech was improper and it was wrongly admitted at the trial. The Appellant had been particularly irked by the Prosecutors comments that the appellant was afraid of the truth. The Court rejected this argument as well since it was meant to admonish the Appellant to consider the whole evidence before the trial Court rather than emphasize on only part of the evidence as he was trying to do. Further the comment on the Appellant being afraid of the truth was meant to answer the Appellants contention that he had been forced to cross the centre line by another person who was not at the trial.
Fourthly, the Appellant had argued the Prosecutor was guilty of reversible misconduct for suggesting to the jury that they should imagine the possible line of defense of the severed co-defendant. This, the Appellant argued, amounted to telling the jury to consider evidence which was not before it. In the same vein the Appellant strongly objected to the Prosecutors act of emphasizing that there was a risk that the death of victim might go unpunished.The Appellant reasoned this amounted to pressurizing the jury to find the Appellant guilty irrespective of the facts. Te Court similarly rejected this line of argument as the Prosecutors comments were geared towards answering the Appellants defense that he was not to blame and that it was the severed co-defendant who led him to cross the center line thereby causing the accident.
Lastly, the Appellant had argued the Court should apply the doctrine of accumulation of errors in his favor and order a reversal. The Court rejected this argument as it could not find a single error on the part of the trial Court.
Having rejected the Appellants grounds of appeal, the Court affirmed the conviction of the trial Court.
Personal comments
This case offers an invaluable lesson especially on the constitutional guarantee of the right to silence and its application in trials. The attempt by the Appellant to stretch its application to such heady heights as in this case opens the mind of a Court room lawyer in a special way as to the possibilities and limitations of the guarantee.
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